Moury Construct SA (MOUR): A €213M Small-Cap With €116M Net Cash, 85% 5-Year Avg. ROIC, and ~10% Revenue Growth — Trading at Just 3x LTM EV/EBITDA
Technical expertise, decades of reputation and client relationships: Exploring a rare European gem with the kind of value-for-money I haven’t seen in a long time
Dear Reader: This is the third investment write-up I publish here, and it’s a long one. This company presents a rare mix of extreme undervaluation and financial robustness. The stock offers significant margin of safety and the company’s steady profitability and record order backlog provide confidence in the durability of earnings. Given Moury consistent performance, high returns on capital, and prudent management I believe it presents a great opportunity.
To have a first glimpse of this company reputation in Belgium, I recommend reading this brief article about Moury’s past, present and future that you can translate to English. Finally, after reading the write-up I’d recommend taking a look at this candid recap of last year’s shareholder’s meeting.
Let’s dive in!

If you prefer a PDF or Google Doc version of the write-up, you can download it using the links below:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rNmdo3TJuMy6WURDNHDj6EudAglVgr2u95qncuXWTrs/edit?usp=sharing
As always, this is not a recommendation or investment advice, I’m just someone writing on the Internet using Google Translate and ChatGPT to translate the financials. Please refer to the disclaimer at the end.
Setting the Stage: Why This Undervalued Builder Stands Out
Moury is a construction company based in Belgium. The firm has been around for over a century, and I believe it represents a good example of a mature, well-run construction firm.
Before dismissing the company based on the industry it operates in, I encourage you to read a bit further. I’ll aim to demonstrate why Moury is not your typical construction company.
Founded in 1920 and still headquartered in Liège, Moury is a fourth-generation family business. With approximately 350 employees, it specializes in both new construction and renovation projects across residential, commercial, and public infrastructure. This diversified exposure within the construction industry is what provides a degree of insulation against cyclical downturns.
Now, there are two characteristics of this company that rank high on my list of desirable traits: longevity (they’ve been around for more than a hundred years) and low or no debt.
Moury strategy is built around staying profitable and being conservative with capital—also qualities I value highly in cyclical sectors like construction. They run a clean balance sheet, avoid overextending, and maintain a disciplined dividend policy. Given the nature of Belgium’s construction industry—low-growth and highly cyclical—I don’t expect Moury to radically change its stripes anytime soon.
This company has a massive amount of net cash on its balance sheet, record levels of backlog, operates with negative working capital (excluding excess cash), consistently delivers stellar returns on capital (5-year average ROCE of ~21%, the ROIC is even higher), trades at around 3x LTM EV/EBITDA, and converts nearly all its earnings into free cash flow each year.
Intrigued? Let’s begin with the deep dive.
Don’t Judge the Industry by Its Cover
One of the reasons this company has been ignored by the market so far (besides liquidity) is that it belongs to an unloved industry, the construction industry.
When you think about the construction industry, you typically think: cyclicality, high capex, project delays, cost overruns, lumpy revenue and who know what else.
Now, why wold I say Moury is not like your typical construction company?
Well, we all know that during recessions, demand for construction projects often drops. But when I look at Moury’s growth profile, what stands out to me is not just the increase in revenue, it’s how efficiently they’ve scaled. Back in the late 2010s, Moury’s top line hovered between €100–130 million. Now it’s approaching €200 million and they haven’t sacrificed margins to get there. In fact, margins have expanded.
Over the past five years, operating profit has grown at an average rate of more than 27% per year. This is the result of everything Moury does right: keeping fixed costs low, exercising tight control over projects, and being selective about what they take on. They’ve built a model that allows them to convert incremental revenue into real profit and have a diversified enough profile to resist the cycle better.
Now, on Capex they have been investing around only 1.3% of revenues. Not to mention that usually working capital is a generator of cash for them, more on that later.
On project delays and cost overruns, for what I could find they have a reputation of delivering in time and on budget. This is a company with more than one hundred years of history, so reputation is hard earned.
I could go on and on, but suffice to say, in this brief section, that Moury doesn’t do things the traditional way. They have developed a business model that works for them and in the segment of construction that they operate and they are very strict in keep what’s working.
So what is that business model? Let’s take a look at the company in more detail now.
Inside Moury Construct’s Business
Full-Stack Construction
What I like about Moury is how it operates as a full-spectrum general contractor, taking on residential, commercial, and industrial projects for a diverse mix of clients—everything from municipalities and public agencies to private developers and corporations.
Whats different about Moury is the breadth of in-house capabilities. Through its subsidiaries, it handles a wide range of trades internally—general carpentry, thermal and acoustic insulation, metal joinery, and even the prefabrication of concrete elements. With the recent acquisition of D-FI (more on that below), Moury also brought HVAC and technical installations in-house. That kind of vertical integration gives Moury tighter control over quality and scheduling, which matters a lot in this industry.
Most of Moury’s operations are based in Belgium, especially in Wallonia and Brussels, but it also has a meaningful presence in Luxembourg through a local subsidiary. Moury’s ability to deliver end-to-end construction solutions—from the structural shell to the technical systems and finishing—gives it a competitive edge in a market that still sees a lot of fragmentation and subcontracting.

A Century in the Making: From Liège to the Euronext
Moury Construct has a rich history. Founded back in 1920 in Liège, the company has stayed under family leadership for over a century—now in its fourth generation. They started as a local builder and have steadily evolved into a publicly listed contractor on Euronext Brussels.
A while ago, I wrote about the characteristics I would look for in a company if I were to hold it for 100 years. Having already a century of history under its belt helps Moury check many of the boxes I outlined in that piece. To be clear, I would never invest in a company solely because it has been around for over a hundred years—but I do appreciate the Lindy Effect bonus.
Over the years, Moury built a strong track record in both public works—like schools and civic buildings, and private developments, especially in its home region.
Today, Moury generates close to €200 million in annual revenue and employs more than 350 people. It’s firmly established as one of Belgium’s top mid-sized construction groups, and one that continues to grow.
Owning the Value Chain: From HVAC to Joinery—In-House
Moury is a holding company, yes…but one that's been organized along its major business lines to maintain control across the construction value chain.
At the center of it all is Entreprises G. Moury SA, the flagship entity. This is where the main activities of the group are done—handling primary building construction, structural work, and project management. It’s essentially the engine behind Moury’s residential, non-residential, and industrial builds across Belgium.
Beyond that core, Moury has built out a series of specialty subsidiaries that allow it to self-perform many of the trades that you would typically see subcontracted out.
For instance, Mosabois SC handles carpentry and insulation, and Bemat SA focuses on metal fabrication and aluminum joinery. And in 2023 they did the acquisition of D-FI SA, along with its sub-units Volt-Air and Sandri. That brought mechanical and HVAC capabilities in-house—this type of acquisition of course increases margin control and keeps projects on schedule.
Moury also participates in real estate development through joint ventures. It owns half of Liège Promotion SA, a real estate development firm, and holds meaningful stakes in vehicles like Louvrex 133 SA and AXS Liège SA, which handle specific projects or public-private partnerships (like the Jonfosse pool project in Liège, where Moury owns 25%). Through Mourylux SA, the company also extends its contracting operations into Luxembourg.
What this all adds up to is a group that is also well-coordinated. Each subsidiary runs with its own management, but they clearly operate in sync. It’s a structure that allows Moury to execute complex projects with a lot of agility.
I see this subsidiary structure as providing three main benefits:
It allows them to retain more margin in-house without relying on subcontractors.
The subsidiaries can coordinate more effectively with one another to ensure projects are delivered on time and within budget.
It helps secure access to qualified labor when needed—especially important given the frequent shortages of specialized trades in the industry.
You can see the whole picture below:

Competitive Positioning: Punching Above Its Weight
In Wallonia, Moury is widely recognized as a top-tier regional builder. It’s smaller than giants like BESIX or CFE, but it has carved out a sweet spot in mid-sized contracts where it can punch above its weight by leaning on their reputation, tight execution, and its vertically integrated structure.
Look, this mid-market focus plays to Moury’s strengths. It operates in a space where large multinationals might be too bulky to move efficiently, and where smaller local firms don’t have the capabilities or balance sheet to compete. That dynamic gives Moury an edge—especially in public tenders, where its track record and family-owned stability make it a preferred partner. There are many examples on how that reputation has translated into recurring work on schools, municipal buildings, and infrastructure projects across Wallonia.
This plays directly into their strategy of being really selective on the type of projects they bid for. They don’t chase every contract—they go after projects where they have an edge and can negotiate acceptable terms. That selectivity, combined with their in-house capabilities, allows them to avoid the low-margin trap that plagues much of the industry (and you can see this right in their margins).
Geographically, Moury’s strength is concentrated in French-speaking Belgium—Wallonia and parts of Brussels. They’ve focused on a region where they have cultural fluency, entrenched networks, and institutional credibility.
From what I can gather, Moury is a classic 'big fish in a small pond’. It might not be a household name outside of Belgium, but in its home market, it’s a household name. Its financial strength is a key differentiator, too; especially now, when so many small construction firms are struggling with cash flow1. Clients want to know their contractor can finish the job, and Moury’s balance sheet gives them that assurance.
In the end, what I like most about Moury’s strategy is that they don’t try to be everything to everyone. Instead, they focus on profitable niches; like complex renovations and public projects that require technical know-how and executes with discipline. That’s what makes me believe the company can continue to outperform, even alongside peers many times its size.
Business Model and Operations
Revenue Streams: How Moury Makes Money
When I broke down how Moury Construct makes money, it became clear that this is a pure construction services business—almost all of the revenue comes from building or renovating physical structures. There's no product manufacturing, just simple execution-focused contracting.
Of course, that focus has its challenges (project-based revenue can be lumpy), but it also creates a straightforward, capital-efficient model where you start seeing that scale and specialization matter.
The core of Moury’s revenue comes from general contracting. This is where they act as the main builder; taking on fixed-price or unit-rate contracts to deliver a completed structure. You have a mix bag here, these contracts span everything from new schools and courthouses to apartment complexes and hospital renovations (see Appendix).
Revenue gets recognized under percentage-of-completion accounting, so it flows in as the project progresses. And while individual contracts can be volatile, the relatively big number of concurrent projects, often dozens at once, smooths out the top line. In 2023, that model delivered over €196 million in consolidated revenue, with much of it coming from long-term relationships with repeat public clients. It’s not subscription revenue but that steady base is important. It’s important to mention that revenue came -4% in 2024, so it can be lumpy.
Then you have the revenue coming from Moury’s specialty subsidiaries—Mosabois, Bemat, and D-FI. A lot of that is internal: these units perform carpentry, joinery, or HVAC work on Moury’s own projects. But there’s also potential for these teams to work externally. D-FI, for instance, can now take on third-party HVAC contracts on projects where Moury isn’t the lead contractor. That creates a new revenue stream, especially as demand for technical trades increases. External contracting by subsidiaries is still small, but it’s an area I think Moury could lean into further—utilizing these teams more fully and broadening the revenue base.
Moury also occasionally gets involved in development. It’s not their main business (they’re not speculative developers) but they sometimes co-develop buildings via joint ventures, like with Liège Promotion. In those cases, Moury might earn income from the eventual sale of a property, or recognize a share of JV profits. That kind of revenue doesn’t flow through the top line (it’s usually recorded as income from associates via equity accounting) but it does contribute to bottom-line earnings.
Moury’s revenue model is its something you can easily understand. They win contracts, deliver the work, and get paid. It’s project-based, so the pipeline matters—a lot. That’s why I track their backlog and order intake closely (more on that below). But it’s also a model that can grow through some smart additions: more technical services, more third-party subcontracting, more JV deals, and perhaps even more post-construction services.
Backlog at a Record High: Two Years Booked, and Growing
Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, backlog grew from €248 million to €335 million, and by early 2025, it increased another 8% to €361 million. That’s a clear sign they’re winning more work than they’re burning through; a positive book-to-bill ratio, which is exactly what I like to see.
For a construction firm, having close to two years of forward revenue already locked in provides exceptional visibility and stability.
Whats more, if you look at the composition of that backlog it’s not dependent on a single mega-project. Instead, it’s a well-diversified mix—everything from a hospital wing expansion and a major college campus renovation to an apartment complex, seismic retrofitting of a heritage building, and smaller municipal upgrades2.
I include more details on their current projects in the Appendix, but if you haven’t already, I encourage you to visit their website to explore the types of projects they’ve completed and what they’re currently working on. Some are flagship developments—such as the renovation of the Liège Theatre; that showcase the company’s capabilities and reputation.

Looking ahead, even though the private sector may be in difficult moment, the public environment supports further pipeline growth. Wallonia’s “Plan Infrastructure” program is rolling out school renovations, Brussels is prepping EU institution buildings for green upgrades, and new hospitals are in the pipeline under public-private partnership models. Moury is actively bidding on many of these and management has already signaled that a wave of new orders was expected beyond the June 2024 backlog, and the early 2025 figures confirm those deals are landing.
It’s worth to mention that a company like this, gets a significant amount of repeat business—cities, institutions, and developers they’ve worked with before come back to them. That repeat factor not only reduces sales effort but helps maintain the quality of the pipeline.
Industry Analysis: Building Through Headwinds
Scaffolding a Recovery
The Belgium construction industry it’s a fragmented industry made up of thousands of companies (mostly small and mid-sized firms) employing around half a million people, depending on how you count.
Projections are pointing to a compound annual growth rate of about 3.4% through 2028. On the investment side, construction — including both infrastructure and building projects — pulled in close to €70 billion in 2023. That includes both new builds and renovations, which have become increasingly important.
So you cannot analyze the whole industry as a monolith, there are different segments with different dynamics each and even though Moury have or had a participation in most of them; right now the distribution is uneven.
But let’s analyze the dynamics of each sector one by one. During its long history Moury participated in almost all those sectors:
In the residential building segment, new construction took a significant hit in 2023, due to high interest rates. In contrast, the renovation segment performed well, supported by new energy performance standards. Many property owners were compelled to retrofit their buildings, resulting in growth in this segment.
Looking ahead, the persistent housing deficit in major cities is expected to drive long-term growth in the residential segment, especially as financing becomes more accessible.
In the non-residential segment (offices, warehouses, schools, hospitals, etc.), there was also a decline in 2023, driven primarily by the office sector, which continues to face headwinds from the rise in remote work post-COVID. In contrast, logistics and public buildings remained resilient, supported by sustained growth in e-commerce and government spending.
Moury is particularly active in the renovation of offices and schools, hospital upgrades, and other institutional projects that benefit from public backing or are supported by EU funds.
On the civil engineering front (roads, bridges, utilities, etc.), Moury is not a major player—this segment, as I understand it, is typically dominated by large infrastructure contractors. Nevertheless, the company could still benefit indirectly from large-scale projects, as it may be contracted to build depots, maintenance facilities, or administrative buildings necessary to support the main infrastructure works.
It’s also worth highlighting that the two segments mentioned earlier—new construction and renovations—are starting to diverge meaningfully in Belgium. Renovations are increasingly becoming the primary driver of growth, fueled by a surge in government-incentivized energy retrofits. The Belgian government is placing particular emphasis on insulation upgrades, solar panel installations, and HVAC modernization.
Moury is well-positioned at the center of these trends, with strong exposure to the types of renovation work that are gaining momentum.

All in all, despite macro headwinds, Moury had multiple growth levers in play and managed to grow sales by 25% in 2023, really a testament to the company's diversified footprint and strong execution. Again, worth mentioning that we did see a softening during 2024 product of new projects timing.
That said, construction industry in general may not be out of the woods yet. High rates, though decreasing, and limited credit availability could still be delaying private projects, and the sluggish permitting process remains a structural bottleneck.
I expect the sector to stabilize at a modest pace over the next couple of years, with the potential for a stronger rebound by 2025 or 2026 if financing costs ease and private sector confidence returns.
Mapping the Competitive Terrain
The industry is filled with players, from one-man operations doing residential remodels to massive multinationals bidding on megaprojects. It’s a tough environment, especially when it comes to pricing. Public tenders are often won or lost on price alone, and that naturally puts downward pressure on margins across the board.
So how is Moury able to achieve the margins it’s reporting?
As I mentioned above, these last few years were tough for the construction industry and 2025 is turning out even tougher. Construction insolvencies in Belgium are peaking3. Rising costs, payment delays, and razor-thin margins have pushed many smaller firms to the brink.
For a financially solid company like Moury, this is an opportunity. When competitors fall away, it can open up space to grow market share or scoop up the assets of distressed firms at attractive prices.
At the end of the day, I think that comes down to two things: vertical integration and discipline. Because Moury can self-perform much of the work (thanks to its trade subsidiaries) it avoids the subcontractor markups that squeeze margins. And it doesn’t chase every contract. They stay away from speculative real estate development and giant civil works projects where cost overruns are almost a given. Instead, they focus on technically demanding jobs where clients value reliability (like renovating historic buildings or retrofitting complex facilities). That’s where expertise counts more than simply being the cheapest bidder.
Regionally, Moury’s closest peers include mid-sized Belgian contractors like Willemen, Thomas & Piron, and CFE Contracting. On a European level, I’ve benchmarked it against names like Heijmans in the Netherlands and NCC in the Nordics (more on this on the Peers comparison section).
Below, find more details on the ones where info was readily available.
Major Belgian Construction Companies and Key Players
Resilience in a Cyclical Industry
I’m well aware that construction is one of the most cyclical sectors out there, booms and busts come with the territory.
Now that interest rates have risen4, I do expect some continuing cooling. But this time, Moury enters this softer phase with a record backlog. Even if new bids slow in 2025, they’ve got enough work already secured to keep operations busy for the next 18 to 24 months.
Interest rates are obviously a headwind—financing is more expensive, and some private clients have already delayed plans. But Moury’s low-debt balance sheet shields it from direct impact. They don’t have big interest payments coming due, so rising rates don’t hit their bottom line like they might for a more leveraged competitor. And we have to also be mindful that they do earn interest on the pile of cash they have in the balance sheet.
Another countercyclical safe-guard, if you will, are public projects. This tend to be more stable, governments don’t pull the plug on infrastructure as quickly as private developers might delay a condo project. Moury’s significant exposure to public buildings, schools, and utilities gives it a built-in stabilizer.
And if governments launch stimulus programs, as they often do in a downturn, Moury is already in position. The EU’s green renovation push is a perfect example. More funding for energy retrofits of public buildings or low-income housing would flow directly into the kind of work Moury already specializes in.
So yes, construction is cyclical. But Moury built a buffer through backlog, having a resilient client base, keeping their balance sheet clean, and maintaining flexibility in how they operate. They were profitable even during 2020.
Now, what about their competitive advantage, does this company have a moat?
Does Moury Really Have a Moat?
If you just look at their return on capital, there’s something going on here. Do they have a moat in this cut-throat industry? What is their competitive advantage?
If you were to look at the classic definition of moats, it would be hard to encapsulate Moury in only one of them.
In my opinion, Moury’s case has more things in common with moats of companies like Starbucks.
Why? Not because they are consumer facing or because they make coffee. But because their competitive advantage is the results of doing a lot of things right, consistently.
In The Little Book That Builds Wealth5, Pat Dorsey explains that moats in consumer discretionary companies like Starbucks often come from brand strength and customer experience, but unlike in some other industries, these moats are usually the result of doing a lot of things right consistently over time—not from a single dominant factor like a patent or regulatory protection.
He points out that in consumer discretionary businesses, brand strength is often a reflection of operational excellence over a long period: quality control, consistent customer experience, smart site selection, effective marketing, etc. It’s doing hundreds of little things right every day. That’s what makes a Starbucks coffee in New York taste and feel like the one in Tokyo.
Now, of course, Moury doesn’t sell coffee but I believe that their competitive advantage stems from doing a lot of things right over and over again. That brand reputation generates value in an industry like this.
The company has built up a valuable set of intangible assets — things like a trusted reputation, deep industry know-how, and long-standing client relationships. That kind of credibility isn’t easy to replicate.
On top of that, Moury runs a lean cost structure and operates at a focused scale within its niche, which allows it to stay agile while still benefiting from specialization. Add to that a long-term oriented culture, careful project selection and you can start to see why they are delivering such amazing results.
And finally let’s not forget the vertical integration. Instead of outsourcing everything, they’ve brought certain trades in-house; like carpentry or HVAC, which gives them better control over quality, timelines, and margins.
So they’ve put layer upon layer of execution and doing things right over the years. The combination helps Moury consistently win profitable work in what is otherwise a very competitive industry.
Putting everything together, you have the following advantages:
How Moury Can Keep Climbing
So, when I look at companies, I take the view that I want to have a margin of safety not only in price, but also in avenues for growth, I want the management team to have many options to growth company’s revenue and profits, in case any of them doesn’t work out. 6
What are Moury’s avenues for growth then? Let’s see.
Growth Opportunities
The most obvious growth driver is simple execution. Moury’s backlog has crossed €361 million, and converting that pipeline into revenue over the next couple of years should naturally push the top line higher.
Between 2021 and 2023, Moury grew revenue from about €134 million to €196 million, that’s a CAGR of 20%. Of course, I’m not expecting that pace every year (2024 saw a decrease of 4% in revenue), but even high single-digit organic growth seems entirely reasonable from here.
The company’s book-to-bill ratio remains healthy, and management has flagged continued high activity levels into 2025. If Moury just delivers on what’s already booked, and keeps replenishing the pipeline, I see a steady, upward path. And with the way margins expanded in 2023 (net profit outpacing revenue) I think earnings could grow at a nice pace.
Beyond organic growth, Moury is expanding what it can offer. The D-FI acquisition7 was a good example, it brought HVAC and M&E capabilities in-house, which opens up a lot more project types.
The same goes for Moury’s finishing trades—carpentry, insulation, joinery. These could be offered more aggressively as standalone services, or bundled into larger turnkey solutions.
Geographically, I don’t expect Moury to make a radical leap outside Belgium, but I do think there’s smart, selective expansion potential. For example, if a project in Flanders needs a type of renovation Moury excels at, they could step in, perhaps with a local partner to bridge regulatory differences.
Luxembourg is another bright spot. With a strong construction market and higher average project values, it’s an attractive adjacent market. Moury already has a presence there through Mourylux, and securing a few high-profile contracts could take that business to the next level. Brussels also remains an under-tapped opportunity. Between EU institutions and ongoing urban development, it’s fertile ground for a builder with Moury’s credentials.
M&A is another lever Moury can pull. They’ve already shown they can integrate acquisitions successfully with the Ourth’Invest/D-FI deal. If more small firms in Belgium face distress (as many are right now8) Moury could selectively pick up assets, talent, or client books at attractive prices. With a clean balance sheet and ample cash, they’ve got the dry powder to act when the right target appears.
As weaker contractors go under, Moury has more room to win work, often at better pricing. Their 35% jump in backlog from mid-2023 to mid-2024 could mean they’re already benefiting from this. Fewer competitors mean less aggressive underbidding, which can help maintain or even lift margins.
Then there’s innovation. Construction isn’t exactly known for moving fast, but change is coming (modular building, BIM, sustainable materials, etc.) and firms that adapt can gain a some edge.
Where I think Moury really stands out, though, is in special projects, especially complex renovations. This is a segment where a lot of smaller contractors get overwhelmed. But Moury has the in-house capabilities to handle the full scope. Whether it’s retrofitting a heritage site, upgrading an occupied hospital wing, or modernizing an industrial facility without disrupting operations, Moury has built a niche in tackling jobs that require technical precision.

When I put it all together, I see Moury as a company with mid-single to low-double-digit annual revenue growth potential over the next few years, and potentially higher profit growth if they hold the line on margins. They just need to keep doing what they’re doing: execute backlog, expand where they have an edge, and avoid the traps that weaker players fall into.

So, looking ahead, I don’t expect Moury to suddenly start expanding into France or the Netherlands. They’re very much a “stick to what we know” type of business. Belgium (and particularly the Wallonia-Brussels-Luxembourg corridor) still offers plenty of opportunity. It’s a large, fragmented market with tons of mid-sized construction and renovation contracts up for grabs.
Tailwinds & Demand Drivers
Ok, so far we’ve seen that there is space to growth in market segments they are actually participating in. But what are the trends and demand drivers that are fostering growth in those segments? Let’s see.
For starters, urbanization continues to play a steady role. Cities like Brussels, Liège, and Charleroi keep growing, not super fast, but steadily enough to require ongoing investment in housing and infrastructure.
Public investment is another major pillar. Right now, there’s significant funding flowing into infrastructure upgrades (schools, hospitals, roads, and clean energy). Belgium has mobilized both national budgets and EU recovery funds, especially post-COVID.
And then, there’s the push for sustainability. The EU’s Green Deal and climate targets set in motion a multi-decade effort to retrofit buildings and drastically cut energy use9. In Belgium, that’s translating into grants, tax incentives, and mandates for upgrades like insulation, HVAC modernization, and solar installations.
On the private side, corporate investment cycles drive a lot of demand, especially in industrial and logistics construction. Office space is more uncertain with the shift to hybrid work, but in prime locations there’s still strong demand for high-end, flexible office renovations.
Finally, there’s the rebound effect. After the pandemic and the energy shock of 2022, some projects that were shelved are now making a comeback.
So when I step back and consider all these factors, what I see is a company with demand coming from multiple fronts—some cyclical, some structural. In the short term, renovation demand and public spending are providing the most visible lift. But over the long term, it’s the massive energy retrofit agenda, the ongoing urbanization, and the replacement cycle of old infrastructure that I believe will sustain Moury’s business.

Financial Analysis: A Deep Dive
In this section I’ll go through the different items on my checklist to perform a through financial analysis. If you think you don’ t need that much detail, feel free to skip it. I do recommend the section on returns on capital as it provides clarity on how profitable are their operations.
Let’s start with a summary of the 2024 financial metrics.
Overview of Recent Performance
When I looked at Moury Construct’s FY2024 results, what stood out was their resilience. Yes, revenue dipped slightly (down 4% to €186.3 million from €194.0 million in 2023), but that decline was mostly a timing issue. A lot of their projects were just ramping up in the second half of the year, so some of that revenue will spill into future periods.
What really matters to me is that despite the softer top line, Moury kept things tight operationally. Operating profit came in at €29.1 million (just a hair below last year’s €30.2 million) and the operating margin held steady at around 15.5%, which is impressive in a contracting revenue environment.
Now, if you look at revenue, the first thing that stands out is its project-based nature. Each contract is a one-off, which means revenue naturally ebbs and flows depending on project timing and how quickly the backlog gets executed.
That said, under IFRS 15, they recognize revenue over time based on how far along a project is. And the current visibility is tremendously strong: as of February 28, 2025, the order backlog hit a record €361 million, up 8% from mid-2024. Confirming that the revenue softness in 2024 was likely just a timing issue. A lot of those backlogged projects should convert into revenue this year, putting the business back on a growth track.
So while Moury doesn’t have the comfort of recurring revenue, the consistent replenishment of its order book gives me confidence that demand for their construction services remains strong and steady.
So that’s on the revenue side, what about cost?
One of the things I really like about Moury’s model is its flexible cost structure. Most of the company’s expenses are variable, directly tied to the projects in progress, things like materials, subcontractors, and other job-specific costs. That kind of setup gives Moury some natural protection when activity slows down.
Of course, not all costs are variable. Personnel expenses ticked up around 10% in 2024, but for good reason: Moury brought in a skilled HVAC team through its acquisition of the D-FI group. They added around 90 employees to the payroll.
Accounting Practices
The company reports under IFRS, and from what I’ve seen, it tends to err on the side of caution, something I always appreciate, especially in construction, where project risks can escalate quickly.
Take their revenue recognition, for example. Moury doesn’t front-load profits. They also make provisions for potential losses or risks on contracts, and interestingly, they reversed some of those provisions in both 2023 and 2024. Specifically, they released €0.48 million in 2024 and €1.24 million the year before (amounts they had previously set aside just in case).
Asset values also seem ok. Goodwill from acquisitions is held at cost and there were no impairments recorded in 2024. That suggests the deals they’ve made are holding up well.
Moury doesn’t publish EBITDA directly, but it’s easy enough to back into it. In 2024, operating profit plus depreciation landed around €31 million. More importantly, there’s tight alignment between reported net income (€24.4 million) and actual cash flow metrics.
The accounting policies are standard, and the financials are audited by BDO Réviseurs d’Entreprises. Importantly, those audits have been clean, no qualifications, no red flags. Everything lines up.
Balance Sheet Analysis
Asset Base and Liquidity
Total assets came in at €207.1 million (up 9% from the prior year)and most of that growth came from current assets, fueled by strong operating cash flow.
The cash position alone is impressive: €99.47 million in pure cash at year-end, up from €90.16 million in 2023. And on top of that, Moury’s sitting on another €20.57 million in short-term financial investments.
All told, total cash comes to €119.6 million. That’s up from €99.8 million the year before, and it means more than half the company’s total assets are sitting in cash or cash-like instruments.
This kind of liquidity gives the company enormous flexibility, whether for acquisitions, reinvestment, or simply weathering any future storms. Of course, the question mark is which are their future plans for that cash, but I’ll discuss that later.
Working Capital
Look into Moury’s working capital, and you will see a healthy, well-managed engine that supports cash generation. Just look at these average days outstanding metrics:
Let’s start with receivables.
At the end of 2024, accounts receivable came in at €18.35 million, down sharply from €28.8 million the year before. That ~36% drop shows the company did a great job collecting on its 2023 billings. It also lines up with slightly lower revenue and the timing of newer projects, early-phase jobs just don’t have as many invoices out yet.
On the flip side, inventory and contracts in progress, the work-in-progress bucket, rose to €29.83 million from €22.7 million. That makes sense given all the new project activity. Moury has already incurred costs and delivered work that hasn’t yet been billed, so we’re seeing that accumulate in contract assets. It’s not a red flag, it just reflects the stage of those projects. As milestones are hit, this WIP will convert into receivables and then into cash.
Trade payables and accrued expenses held steady at €54.78 million, almost flat versus last year. Meanwhile, other current liabilities (things like customer advances and accruals) dropped to €7.64 million from €10.76 million.
The key takeaway for me is that Moury’s working capital is still a net source of cash. We saw strong cash generation in 2023 from reducing WIP, and only a moderate rebuild in 2024. Receivables are low, DSO looks tight, and there's no inventory obsolescence risk because most of that “inventory” is just unbilled work that’s already underway. Bottom line: the company is running a tight ship on working capital.
Long-Term Asset Base
What’s impressive here is how lean Moury is for a company of its scale. It operates as a remarkably efficient, asset-light business, especially compared to others in the construction industry. Just look at the fixed asset turnover ratio below:
As of 2024, property, plant, and equipment totalled just €18.21 million net of depreciation, up slightly from €17.77 million in 2023. Most of that consists of the usual suspects: company-owned land and buildings, plus construction gear like cranes, vehicles, and other machinery. The modest increase suggests Moury has been reinvesting in operations as confirmed by their €2.46 million in capital expenditures last year.
On the intangible side, they’re carrying €13.76 million, nearly all of which is goodwill from past acquisitions. The big one was in 2023 when they bought the D-FI group (Ourth’Invest), a building services and HVAC contractor.
More interesting is the €5.82 million in “other financial assets” on the non-current side. In 2024, Moury started allocating some of its surplus cash into longer-term investments, about €3 million into non-equity securities, €0.35 million into equities, and even a €0.5 million loan. Not a fan of a construction company investing in this type of assets but have to recognize it’s a small portion of the total.
All in, Moury’s long-term assets are modest, especially relative to revenue. The business doesn’t need to tie up a lot of capital in physical infrastructure. Most of its assets are either financial—cash and short-term investments—or goodwill from acquisitions. That’s part of what makes the model so compelling: it doesn’t take a lot of capital to keep things running or growing.
Capital Structure
I touched on this already, but Moury’s capital structure is one of the most conservative structures you can find (my thoughts on this here).
As of year-end 2024, the company had just €2.07 million in total financial debt, down slightly from €2.71 million the year before. That breaks down into €1.35 million of long-term debt and €0.72 million due within a year.
It’s no surprise that interest expense is basically a rounding error. In fact, Moury’s net financial income in 2024 was positive, meaning it earned far more from interest on its massive cash pile than it paid out on debt.
The structure is overwhelmingly equity-based, which fits the profile of a family-run business with deep roots. Shareholders’ equity stood at €124.74 million at the end of 2024, up from €104.78 million the year before. That increase came primarily from retained earnings: the company earned about €24.4 million in net income and held on to around €20 million after paying dividends.
Moury has 400,585 shares but 4,665 are hold in treasury so we end up with a total of 395,920 shares. And it's worth noting that the Moury family still controls the company. There are no preferred shares, no convertibles, no funny equity instruments, just common stock.
As you can see, growth has come from retained earnings and the occasional bit of debt, not through issuing new shares. In fact, the share count has been remarkably stable.
A Fortress Balance Sheet with Built-In Optionality
I’m sure you have heard it before. But these financials are fortress-like.
Liquidity? Abundant. Current assets comfortably eclipse total liabilities.
And leverage? Almost nonexistent.
Thanks to its big cash position, the company is benefiting from higher interest rates. Financial income is rising, turning what’s normally a risk factor into a line item of upside.
All subsidiaries are consolidated, associate stakes and financial assets are transparently disclosed, and provisions for legal or operational risks total just €2.65 million, and dropped in 2024.
Bottom line?
Moury’s balance sheet is conservative. This is a company that could double its dividend, go shopping for bolt-on deals, or simply do nothing and keep compounding.
Income Statement Analysis
Revenue And Growth
After two big years of growth, Moury took a small step back on the top line in 2024. The company posted €186.34 million in revenue, which is down about 4% from the record €194.03 million it hit in 2023. But to put that in context: 2023 was up 25% year-over-year, and 2022 was up around 15%. This was largely driven by timing, many of the newer contracts were still in ramp-up mode during 2024. That means Moury was incurring costs and setting up sites, but not yet recognizing as much revenue. A lot of that work should roll into 2025, which sets the stage for a rebound. We will see what happens, but judging by the record backlog, odds are good.
Below is revenue evolution during the last 6 years:
Geographically and operationally, the picture is pretty simple. Moury is focused entirely on Belgium and Luxembourg, and all of its revenue comes from construction. So this short-term slowdown was broad-based, not tied to any one region or project falling through.
From a segment perspective, the heavy lifting still comes from Moury’s two main subsidiaries: Entreprises G. Moury and Bemat. Together, they generate more than 85% of the company’s total revenue. In 2024, there was also a full-year contribution from the newly acquired D-FI group (Ourth’Invest), which added around €15.5 million in HVAC and technical contracting revenue.
And when I look at the customer mix, it’s nicely diversified: Moury serves residential, commercial/public, and industrial clients, with no outsized exposure to any one contract. You can see a list of the current project sin the Appendix.
Profitability and Margins
In spite of the above mentioned dip in revenue, the company managed to keep margins intact.
Now, Moury doesn’t report a gross profit line explicitly, but we can get a sense of gross margin by looking at gross value added—revenue minus material and subcontracting costs. That figure actually increased to €53.2 million in 2024 from €51.8 million the year before. So even though revenue fell, direct costs fell a bit more. It may just have been the current project mix during the year though.
On the cost side, personnel expenses did rise about 10% to €21.95 million. That makes sense, given the integration of the D-FI HVAC workforce as previously mentioned. But it didn’t derail the margin story.
Depreciation stayed flat at around €2.44 million.
There were also some non-cash tailwinds in operating income. In 2024, Moury reversed €0.48 million in provisions and recovered €0.16 million in previously written-off receivables. Those helped, though the boost was smaller than in 2023, when reserve releases totaled €1.24 million.
All in, operating profit (EBIT) dipped just 3.5% to €29.11 million. Moury has now delivered ~15% EBIT margins three years running (15.3% in 2022, 15.4% in 2023 and 15.5% in 2024), which speaks volumes about its project selection and execution discipline. You can see margin evolution since current CEO, Gilles-Olivier Moury, took over in 2013 in the following chart:
Below the operating line, Moury got another boost from its financial income. Net financial income came in at €3.86 million, up from €2.3 million in 2023. With very little debt on the books, interest expense was negligible. But with average cash balances north of €100 million and rising interest rates in 2024, interest income jumped. That alone explains much of the increase, but there were also some gains on Moury’s investment portfolio: €1.52 million in mark-to-market adjustments on equities and funds, compared to €0.41 million in 2023.
Pre-tax profit ended up at €32.78 million, basically flat versus €32.58 million last year. The tax bill came in at €8.36 million, putting the effective tax rate around 25.5%—in line with Belgian norms, especially after accounting for some tax-exempt investment income.
Bottom line: net income landed at €24.42 million, almost unchanged from €24.38 million in 2023. Net margin even improved a bit, hitting 13.1% compared to 12.6% the prior year (thanks to the tailwind from financial income).
In short, Moury showed in 2024 that it can protect profits even when revenue flattens out—and in construction, I’d say that’s pretty remarkable.
Expense Analysis
So what about the cost structure? Well, a few things stand out here, most of them positive.
Starting with purchases (basically materials and subcontracting), we can back into the number by subtracting gross value added from revenue. For 2024, that works out to about €135 million in purchases (€186.3M in revenue minus €51.2M in value added). That’s down from roughly €144.5 million in 2023, a 6.5% drop, even though revenue only fell 4%. Probably benefited from a slightly more favorable project mix or achieved some cost efficiencies.
Personnel costs came in around €22 million in 2024, which is about 11.8% of revenue; up from 10.3% the year before (given D-FI acquisition).
If I do a quick rough-cut of value added minus personnel, depreciation, and the provision reversals, I get around €29 million left; which aligns closely with the reported EBIT.
Profitability Trends
If you look at Moury’s profitability over the past few years, the trend is undeniably upward. Net margins have climbed from around 9.5% in 2019–2020 to over 13% in 2024.
Operating margins tell a similar story. Back in 2021, they were hovering around 12.7%. By 2022, they jumped to ~15%, and they’ve held steady at that level ever since.
I suspect Moury has become more disciplined in how it prices and selects projects, steering toward higher-value work and avoiding low-margin jobs. The move into specialized areas like HVAC and building services through the D-FI acquisition likely helped too, those niches often carry better margins than traditional construction contracts.
It’s also worth remembering that 2021 was still partially clouded by COVID disruptions and inflationary pressure. Since then, Moury has clawed back margin and then some. In short, the underlying quality of earnings looks solid, as solid as they can be for a company in the construction industry at least.
Holding the Line: Profit Quality in a Transition Year
Revenue recognition looks not only appropriate but arguably conservative. If anything, the company let revenue dip in 2024 despite a record backlog.
Of course, Moury does use percentage-of-completion accounting, which can sometimes hide trouble, like showing profits early on a contract that later goes sideways. But in this case, I don’t see any signs of that. Margins have been stable, and their approach to provisions gives me even more confidence. They book expected losses conservatively, and then reverse provisions later if those risks don’t materialize.
There were no extraordinary items in 2023 or 2024, which is good. And I haven’t spotted any signs of aggressive capitalization either. Costs like bidding or small development projects look to be expensed straight through the P&L. The only capitalized items on the balance sheet are tangible equipment and goodwill from acquisitions, nothing out of the ordinary there.
If there’s one area I’m keeping an eye on, it’s financial income. About 16% of pre-tax profit in 2024 came from this line, and that number can move around with interest rates and market performance.
In 2022, Moury actually posted a small loss here when markets dipped, and in 2024 they got a lift thanks to rising rates and gains on their equity holdings. That volatility doesn’t concern me too much (the company keeps its risk exposure limited, with only a modest allocation to equities) but it’s worth watching. A €1–2 million swing on a €30 million profit isn’t going to move the needle, but it does add a bit of noise.
All told, Moury’s earnings look very high-quality to me. They’re backed by work on real projects, supported by cash flow. The dip in 2024 revenue was well explained, and with the backlog where it is, I expect that to reverse in 2025.
Cash Flow Analysis
Operating Cash Flow
Moury Construct’s operating cash flow has been consistently strong over time, though it does swing quite a bit year to year due to the inherent working capital movements in the construction business.
In FY2024, operating cash flow came in at €21.5 million, which is a step down from the exceptionally strong €44.1 million we saw in 2023. But that earlier figure had benefitted from a major working capital release as well, so it’s not really an apples-to-apples comparison.
To put it in perspective, net income was roughly €24.4 million in both years, so the delta in CFO is almost entirely about timing, specifically, how cash flows through inventory, receivables, and customer advances. In 2023, several large projects wrapped up and were billed out. That released a lot of cash: contract assets and inventories dropped, receivables were collected quickly, and there was a high level of customer prepayments going into the year. The net impact was over €9 million in positive working capital contribution.
In 2024, that flipped. Moury had to deploy capital into new projects, which meant more work-in-progress and fewer customer advances. Inventories and contracts in progress rose by about €7.1 million, and customer advances fell by around €3.1 million. Both of those were cash outflows. On the plus side, receivables fell by over €10 million, so we did see some inflow there; clients were paying off their invoices faster. When I net it all out, the working capital movement in 2024 still ended up slightly positive, but well below the windfall we saw in 2023.
Tax payments also had a noticeable impact; cash taxes were €6.7 million in 2024 versus €5.5 million the year prior. When I adjust for non-cash items like depreciation and provision reversals, the gross operating cash flow (before working capital) was about €24.5 million, compared to €26.8 million in 2023. The decline came mostly from those higher taxes.
So after a modest working capital boost, we landed at around €21.5 million in CFO for the year. That’s still a very healthy figure; about 88% of net income converted into cash. It's not quite 100%, but the shortfall is easily explained. Importantly, there’s no red flag here. These are just normal end-of-project cash flow cycles that tend to even out over time.
For context, back in 2022, CFO was only €9.3 million because the company was ramping up work-in-progress and receivables. Then in 2023, that WIP turned into cash. If I average out the cash flow from 2022 through 2024, it aligns pretty well with net income over that same period. That gives me confidence in the underlying quality of earnings.
One nuance in Moury’s cash flow reporting is how they treat certain treasury actions. The purchase and sale of short-term investments are counted within operating cash flow, since these are more about internal cash management than true investing.
If I strip those treasury flows out to get at the core operating cash from construction projects, then CFO would have been closer to €27 million in 2024 and €34.7 million in 2023. So yes, there's a decline year over year, but it’s far less dramatic.
Bottom line: even with some timing headwinds and reinvestment decisions, Moury’s operating cash flow remains solid.
Investing Cash Flow
In 2024, they spent €6.82M on investing activities. Most of it was straightforward: about €2.46M went into capex for things like construction equipment and vehicles. That’s nearly double the amount they spent the year before.
What really stood out this year was what didn’t happen: there were no acquisitions. That’s a sharp contrast to 2023, when Moury spent €3.38M net to acquire Ourth’Invest/D-FI, though that deal was partially self-financed by the acquired company’s cash balance.
Instead, in 2024, Moury leaned into building out its long-term financial assets. They put €3.79M into non-current investments and increased their stake in associates or joint ventures by another €0.45M.
Bottom line: free cash flow came in strong at around €19M, that’s operating cash flow of €21.5M minus capex. Even with all the other investments, the €6.8M outflow was easily funded by the core business. For context, 2023 was an even bigger year for free cash flow (€42.9M), driven by unusually high operating cash and light reinvestment.
The throughline here is simple: Moury consistently generates more cash than it needs to reinvest. Capex averages just ~€2M per year, or about 1% of revenue, incredibly light. That’s typical in contracting businesses, where equipment is often rented and subcontractors take on capital-heavy tasks. Add in decent margins, and what you get is a company that throws off a lot of free cash flow, year after year.
Financing Cash Flow
What you can see here is how the company has started returning more capital to shareholders while staying conservative on the financing side. In 2024, they had €5.36M in financing cash outflows, mostly from dividends. Specifically, they paid out €4.36M mid-year for the FY2023 dividend, that lines up with the €11.00 gross per share ordinary dividend they had declared. The payout is rising too: in 2023, it was €3.81M, reflecting a €9.70 dividend for FY2022.
Moury also did a small buyback, about €104K worth of shares in 2024. For perspective, €104K at ~€500 a share is only about 200 shares. In 2023, they spent more (€650K), but it’s still not material.
On the debt front. Moury repaid €0.71M in loans during 2024, simply following scheduled amortization. They also paid down another €0.18M in lease liabilities and they took on no new debt. The result? Negative financing cash flow again this year, just like 2023 (–€5.35M). They’re using cash to both reduce leverage and reward shareholders.
The main thing here, though, is the step change in dividend policy going into 2025. With a very strong cash position, Moury’s board declared not just an increased regular dividend of €12.50, but also a special dividend of €5.00 per share for FY2024. They’ve even hinted at repeating the €5 special in 2026 and 2027 (they have stated that this special dividend, "under the usual reservations, should also be granted in 2026 and 2027”).
When I do the math, the FY2024 total dividend will cost them about €7.0M gross. That’s easily manageable, especially considering the €9.3M net cash they added in 2024.
Cash Conversion & Quality
One of the clearest signs of Moury’s business quality, in my view, is how consistently it converts accounting earnings into actual cash. Over 2023 and 2024 combined, the company reported about €48.8M in net income, but operating cash flow came in at €65.6M. That’s a sizable spread, and it mostly comes down to favorable working capital timing. Even when I smooth things out over time, the pattern holds: Moury reliably turns profits into cash. Some years they invest in working capital, other years they release it, but over the cycle, it balances out.
Looking specifically at 2024, free cash flow came in at €19M, a bit lower than the €24.4M in net income — but that shortfall was driven by a working capital build. If I adjust for that and strip out the voluntary financial investments they made, the underlying “operating” FCF was around €24.5M, basically matching net profit. In 2023, the picture was even better: free cash flow before acquisitions blew past net income.
This kind of volatility is par for the course in a project-driven business, but what matters is whether cash ultimately catches up to earnings. In Moury’s case, of course it does.
Working Capital Efficiency
Even though I mentioned before, I wanted to touch a little bit on working capital efficiency. I should mention that they often operate with negative working capital, meaning their current liabilities exceed their current assets (excluding cash). That dynamic actually allows them to generate cash as they grow, which is a good advantage to have.
When I look at the cash flow swings, it’s clear there’s strong timing behind how they bill and collect. That big inflow in 2023, for example, likely came from milestone billings tied to project completions and maybe some advance payments for mid-year project starts. Then in 2024, it looks like they spent more upfront — probably on early-stage site work and procurement, which shows up in higher inventory. But since they came into the year with a solid receivables position and a buffer of customer advances, the overall cash impact was muted.
The bigger picture here is that Moury doesn’t need external financing to fund its operations. The business is self-sustaining. That means they can grow without constantly burning cash. More often than not, they grow and still produce surplus cash.
Cash-Rich and Disciplined
The recent dividend hikes, including special payouts, signal something important: the board knows they’re sitting on more cash than they really need. And even after those dividends are paid, Moury will still be in a strong net cash position. Liquidity isn’t a concern.
All told, Moury’s cash flow engine is a core strength. Operating cash follows the natural rhythm of their project cycle, and over time it closely tracks profitability. They generate consistent free cash flow thanks to minimal reinvestment needs, and their approach is both shareholder-friendly and prudent.
Returns on Capital
Returns on Equity
When I calculate Moury’s return on equity, the numbers are consistently strong. In 2024, ROE came in at about 19.6% — slightly down from 23.3% in 2023, but still very healthy and well above the cost of equity. And that drop isn’t due to weaker performance; net income was flat year-over-year. What changed is the equity base — it grew by around €20M, mostly from retained earnings. In other words, Moury is holding on to capital faster than profits are growing, which makes sense given the historical payout ratio of 30–40%.
Even so, a ~20% ROE is excellent for a construction company. When I zoom out, the long-term trend is even more telling: ROE was around 18.7% in 2021, then climbed to 20.7% in 2022, peaked at 23.3% in 2023, and now has eased slightly.
And with the board stepping up dividends, I expect ROE to settle in the high teens. As a shareholder, that’s exactly what you want to see, right? Capital being either reinvested at high returns or distributed if the opportunity set narrows.

Returns on Assets
I touched on this already, but just in case let’s highlight this point.
Moury’s business is incredibly asset-light. They don’t need heavy infrastructure or massive physical assets to generate solid revenues.
For 2024, ROA was about 11.8%, calculated off €24.4M in net income and €207.1M in total assets. That’s a slight dip from the 12.8% they posted in 2023, but the reason’s pretty straightforward: they built up more cash, which increased the asset base without boosting earnings in the same proportion.
Even so, double-digit ROA in a construction business is outstanding. It means each euro of assets (including a sizable cash buffer) is generating around 12 cents of profit annually. And if I strip out the excess cash and just look at the return on operating assets, the efficiency story gets even stronger.
Return on Invested Capital & Return on Capital Employed
The table below summarizes Moury Construct’s EBIT, NOPAT, capital base, and the resulting ROCE and ROIC over time.

Looking at Moury’s EBIT growth over the last decade, it’s been nothing short of explosive. Back in 2015–2017, EBIT was fairly flat, hovering between €5–6 million.
Then it started to climb: €6.2M in 2018, €7.6M in 2019. But starting in 2020, things really accelerated. EBIT hit €17.3M in 2021, €24.0M in 2022, and peaked at €30.2M in 2023 before easing slightly to €29.1M in 2024.
That 2022 figure is nearly four times the 2015 level.
What drove this?
A big jump in revenues (2023 sales hit ~€194M, up ~45% from 2019) and a substantial margin improvement. Operating margins that used to sit around 5–6% have now reached over 15%, thanks to scale and execution.
On the capital side, Moury’s capital employed (total assets minus current liabilities) grew gradually at first, from around €55M in 2015 to €84M by 2021, but then picked up post-2020. By 2023, it had hit €124M, and for 2024 I estimate it at about €143M. Asset growth has clearly outpaced current liabilities, though those have grown too (from €35M in 2015 to €66.6M in 2023) as activity scaled up. The jump in capital employed during 2022–2023 reflects both larger projects and the D-FI acquisition, which added to both assets and a bit of debt.
What’s most striking , though, is how little invested capital Moury has needed. From 2015 through 2022, they carried virtually no debt and at the same time built up a massive cash cushion. Take 2020, for example: the company had €51.6M in cash against €59.2M in equity, with zero debt. That left only around €7.5M of actual invested capital needed to run the business. Even in 2022, with €83.4M in equity and €55.8M in cash, invested capital was just ~€27.5M.10
It wasn’t until 2023 that invested capital started to rise in a meaningful way. Equity hit ~€104.8M and a modest €2.7M of debt appeared after the D-FI acquisition but with €90M in cash, net invested capital still only came to about €17M.
So for most of the last decade, Moury has effectively run a debt-free business with a massive cash buffer, and very little capital actually tied up in operations.
This is exactly why ROCE has climbed so sharply over time. In the mid-2010s, ROCE was in the high single digits, around 9–11%. The dip in 2024 to around 20% was mostly due to a small EBIT decline and a big increase in assets, especially cash and receivables. But zooming out, ROCE has more than doubled over ten years, and the improvement comes from both rising margins and efficient capital use.
ROIC is even more impressive. In several years, it’s been well above 50%. That’s the effect of having strong EBIT with almost no invested capital.
So what’s the big picture here? Moury is generating consistent, exceptional returns on capital. The company has grown significantly without needing to tie up a lot of cash or take on debt. You have a highly efficient business with a capital-light model.
At the end of 2024, Moury had €124.7M in equity and just €2.1M in debt — so €126.8M of total capital. But here’s the thing: they were also sitting on roughly €120M in cash and short-term investments that, you could argue, aren’t needed to run the business (at least a big part of it).
Of course, the assumption that the company doesn’t need such a large cash pile to run the business might be challenged by its own CEO, who prefers to operate with a significant cash buffer. That said, while the amount truly necessary to run a construction business (excluding bonding, warranties, etc.) is probably greater than zero, €120 million still seems excessive for this company.
Given that Moury operates with negative working capital (meaning suppliers and customers help fund the projects), the main capital truly employed is their fixed asset base (about €18M net) plus a sliver of working capital. So when I compare this against EBIT, which was ~€29.1M in 2024, the ROCE explodes off the page.
That’s a crazy number and practically unheard of in most industries, let alone in construction. It just goes to show how capital-light Moury’s contracting model really is. The business is fueled by client advances and payables, and Moury’s real contribution is project execution, leveraging its team, systems, and technical expertise.
This is exactly why the company has built up such a large cash pile. It’s not that they’re underinvesting, it’s that the business doesn’t need much capital to generate strong profits. It’s an incredibly efficient setup. But with ROIC levels this high, it also raises the bar for what they do with that cash next. Either they find smart ways to redeploy it, or they return more of it to shareholders, because, of course, hoarding it would dilute the very efficiency that makes Moury so compelling.
So, here’s the challenge: what do you do when you’re that good?
They’ve already started to address this by ramping up dividends. When the business can’t find high-return opportunities internally, returning capital to shareholders is the right thing to do and that’s exactly what they’re doing.
Beyond dividends, Moury’s main reinvestment levers are new projects and acquisitions. On the organic side, growth in construction usually just means hiring more people, maybe picking up some equipment, and winning more contracts, and Moury is clearly doing all of that. Thanks to their working capital model, they don’t need to front a lot of cash for these projects, so they can grow without tying up significant new capital, a key reason they’re able to sustain such high ROIC.
Moury can also absolutely deploy capital externally when the right opportunity comes up. Their local knowledge and network give them an edge in identifying value. The only constraint, really, is basically deal flow.
Reinvestment Opportunities
Belgium continues to invest in infrastructure and building development, and Moury’s record order book shows they’re winning their fair share. If they execute these projects well, I expect returns to be in line with what they’ve delivered historically, which is to say, very strong.
On the acquisition side, after the successful D-FI deal, I could see them expanding into adjacent areas — maybe electrical contracting or other specialized construction trades — to build a more vertically integrated offering. The 2024 annual report mentioned that they’ve reorganized and fully merged D-FI and its subsidiaries into Moury’s structure as of January 2024.
Honestly, capital isn’t the constraint here. They have the cash. The bigger challenge is finding targets that align with their risk appetite and cultural values. Moury has always been selective and conservative.
With returns on internally invested capital as high as they are, it’s fair to ask: why doesn’t Moury expand even faster? The answer, as I see it, lies in the nature of the construction business. The bottleneck isn’t financial, it’s operational. Growth in this sector hinges on having enough skilled workers, experienced project managers, and a strong grip on execution risk. Capital is abundant; capacity is the constraint.
Moury seems very aware of this dynamic. They’re not trying to grow at all costs, which I think is a smart move. Aggressive expansion in contracting often ends in headaches (missed deadlines, cost overruns, and margin erosion).
Because of these operational realities, I don’t expect them to reinvest all profits at a 20%+ ROE forever. At some point, returns naturally taper off unless capacity scales in parallel and that takes time.
Bottom line: The company generates high profits off a lean capital base, and management is taking the right steps to ensure that excess capital is either used strategically or returned to shareholders.
As long as Moury keeps its disciplined approach I think they’ll continue to earn exceptional returns on the capital they put to work.

Valuation
As of June 2025, Moury Construct is trading at around €538 per share. With 395,920 shares outstanding, that puts the market cap at roughly €213 million. But when I look at the balance sheet, it’s clear the market isn’t fully pricing in the strength of the company’s financial position or the business characteristics for that matter.
Moury carries almost no debt and has built up a huge cash position over the years. By the end of 2024, net cash (cash, equivalents, and short-term investments minus debt) sat at approximately €119.6 million. That’s a massive buffer, and it reflects just how consistently profitable and disciplined the company has been.
When I adjust for that net cash, Moury’s enterprise value drops to only about €97 million. That means over half of the company’s market cap is backed by cash sitting on the balance sheet. The market seems to be discounting just how efficient and cash-generative this company really is.
Let’s dive into the valuation.
Based on current market values and Moury’s financials, I’ve run a few key valuation multiples, and well… the stock looks cheap.
LTM P/E without adjusting for the cash is 8-9x.And with an enterprise value of just ~€96M and trailing EBITDA of ~€31M, Moury is trading at only 3× EV/EBITDA. For a solid company with double-digit margins, that kind of multiple implies either a serious market misspricing or unjustified pessimism.
EBIT and EBITDA are very close for Moury (~€29.1M EBIT), so the EV/EBIT is also about 3×. That gives you a ~30% implied operating yield on the business.
And with Moury boosting its regular dividend to €12.5 and adding a €5.0 special, they’re still distributing less than they generate. There’s a lot of headroom here for even more shareholder returns.
Bottom line: Moury trades like a business in distress or with fading fundamentals, but the reality is the opposite. The balance sheet is rock-solid, the operations are consistent, margins are strong, and cash flow is abundant. Unless something material changes, I think the market is underappreciating just how valuable this business really is.
Peers
Even though it’s hard to get good comparables given Moury’s size and niche positioning, I compared it to both peers in the European construction contracting space and the broader market, and honestly, the discount is hard to justify.
Moury’s P/E is about 8-9X, that’s below many the European peers (see below).
It’s the same story when I look at EV/EBITDA. Big names like Strabag and Eiffage trade around 4.5–7×. Moury, at ~3×, is well below all of them.
EV/EBIT also the same. Eiffage trades around 8–10×, and many of Moury’s peers fall into that same high-single or low-double-digit range. Moury is at 3.3×, that’s a fraction of peer valuations.
ROE is over 20%, and even the base dividend yield is 2.5% — higher once you include the special. Most peers are in the low teens on ROE and don’t offer much more on yield. Moury has no leverage, strong cash flow, and healthy margins, none of the typical red flags that would justify a discounted valuation. And while it’s not a high-growth company, revenue has been growing at ~9% CAGR from 2020–2024, steady and respectable.
In short, Moury’s financial profile is stronger than many of its peers, yet it trades at significantly lower multiples across the board. Unless the market sees something I’m missing, this feels like a classic case of small cap misspricing.
See a table below with publicly traded “comparables”:
DCF
Even if you do a DCF looks undervalued. I wanted to look at this since all the possible angles so find my assumptions below:
Using a 10% discount rate and a terminal growth rate of 2%, the present value of the operating business lands in the €200–250M range. Then when I add the company’s net cash position, the implied equity value jumps to roughly €320–370M. On a per-share basis, that’s in the ballpark of €900.
So, however I slice it, the DCF suggests that Moury’s intrinsic value is above its current market cap.
Bringing everything together, both the intrinsic valuation and market-based comparisons, it’s clear to me that Moury Construct is materially undervalued.
If Moury just continues along its historical path, steady profitability, modest growth, and disciplined execution, the upside becomes obvious.
And what’s more, the market seems to be ignoring some key positives. The backlog is at record levels, and the board is stepping up shareholder returns. If even a portion of that potential plays out, stable earnings, steady dividends, maybe a bolt-on acquisition, Moury could re-rate higher. There’s real upside that the market doesn’t appear to be factoring in.
Why Might the Stock Be Undervalued Today?
So why is Moury Construct still trading so cheaply, despite its strong fundamentals? After digging into it, I think there are three reasons, none of which are tied to the actual health of the business.
Limited Liquidity and Free Float: The Moury family and insiders control the majority of shares, which leaves a tiny float (only around 159,000 shares). That means the stock barely trades some days, and when it does, the volume is thin. Illiquidity like this tends to turn off institutional investors and often leads to a “liquidity discount.” Investors are hesitant to pay full value for a stock they might struggle to exit.
Lack of Coverage and Visibility: Moury is a small-cap, domestically focused name in a market that doesn’t get much attention. There’s almost no analyst coverage and very little media exposure. Many investors probably haven’t even heard of the company. It’s not part of any major index like the BEL20, so index funds don’t touch it, and even small-cap funds may pass it over.
Sector Perception: Construction is often seen as a low-growth, cyclical, and risky sector — and Moury gets painted with that same brush. Investors worry about things like project delays, cost overruns, and economic sensitivity. Even though Moury’s actual performance has been consistent and its margins are excellent, general sector sentiment can keep the whole group trading at low multiples. Recent concerns like rising material costs or interest rates only reinforce those biases, even if Moury is managing through them just fine.
Family Control and Capital Allocation: Family-owned businesses sometimes trade at a discount due to perceived governance or capital deployment risks. In Moury’s case, the company has built up a huge cash pile, which could be both a strength and a sticking point. Some investors may be skeptical about whether that cash will be put to productive use or simply hoarded. For years, the payout was quite low, and while the recent move to introduce recurring €5 special dividends is a good change, it may take time for skeptics to fully buy in. There’s also the possibility that the market applies a “cash drag” discount because it’s not being used aggressively.
Historical Valuation Anchors: Moury has traded at low multiples for a long time. Its 10-year average P/E is around 12×, and now it’s even lower at ~9×. Or take EV/EBIT at 3x for the last 10 years, now at 3.4x. That kind of inertia can be hard to shake. Investors may just assume it’s a "cheap-for-a-reason" stock (conservative, slow-growing, not particularly exciting). And unless something fundamentally changes, they continue to price it as if that’s all it will ever be.
Cyclical Peak Concerns: Another possible reason? Some investors may believe earnings are at a cyclical peak. Revenues surged in 2023 and margins are at historically high levels, so the market might assume this is as good as it gets, and that a reversion is around the corner. That fear would justify a low multiple. But when I look at the company’s backlog and consistency, I don’t see signs of imminent mean reversion. If anything, the fundamentals argue for continued strength, not decline.
Bottom line: So Moury is small, illiquid, and unglamorous, and that’s probably why it’s so cheap. The company is cautious, focused, and unflashy…but it delivers steady profits and builds real value. Until there’s a catalyst (maybe more aggressive dividend policies, increased visibility, or attention from a larger investor) this miss-pricing might persist.
Why There Might Be a Re-Rating?
So, do we have a catalyst around the corner or not? Well, there are several reasons I believe Moury Construct could be on the brink of a re-rating, and potentially deliver significant upside from today’s levels.
1. The Backlog
The first thing that jumps out at me is the record-high order backlog. As of early 2025, Moury reported €361 million in projects, nearly two years’ worth of revenue visibility baked in. That backlog is growing—up… about 8% from just a few months earlier. If the company can maintain margins, earnings should follow. And with the stock trading at low multiples, I think any hint of renewed growth could be the spark the market needs to reprice it.
2. Capital Returns
Last year there was change in shareholder returns. For fiscal 2024, Moury increased its ordinary dividend from €11.00 to €12.50 per share and added a special dividend of €5.00, bringing the total to €17.50. That’s a yield of ~3.3% at current prices, a material jump from prior levels. They also hinted that they would repeat the special dividend this year and next.
3. Tailwinds in the Sector
While construction is inherently cyclical, there are some structural tailwinds working in Moury’s favor. Government demand for public buildings (schools, hospitals, civic infrastructure) is steady in Belgium, and Moury is well-placed to capture that work. On the renovation side, EU mandates for energy-efficient buildings are creating sustained demand for retrofitting, and Moury is already active in that space. Looking ahead, if rates stabilize or decline, private sector demand could kick in too. All this gives Moury multiple shots on goal: public and private/ new builds and renovations.
Risk Audit
When I look at the risks for this company, I’d say those include many of the typical risk you would expect for a small cap with limited liquidity in a cyclical industry. See the table below.
Appendix
Ongoing and Planned Projects (2025)
Below is a detailed list of Moury Construct SA’s ongoing construction projects as of 2025, with key information for each. Projects are grouped by sector for clarity.
Residential Construction Projects
UKot Student Housing, Sart-Tilman (Liège, Belgium) – A design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) project adding 816 student dormitory units (407 new rooms and 409 renovated in existing buildings) at the University of Liège campus. Contract value: Not disclosed (private PPP). Status: Under construction (site work started April 2024). Expected completion: Q4 2025 for new buildings (renovation phase due by 2027). Partners: Consortium “UKot Liège” (developer LIFE, contractor-investor Moury Construct, property manager Quares, insurer Ethias). Funding: Private PPP – 65-year lease concession. Moury’s role: General contractor (and co-investor) responsible for design and construction. Type: New construction (plus renovation of existing dorm blocks). Sector: Residential (student housing).
Rue Godefroid & Rue des Carmes Apartments (Namur, Belgium) – New construction of multi-family apartment buildings in Namur’s city center. Contract value: Not publicly disclosed. Status: In progress (early stages by 2024). Expected completion: 2025 (estimated). Partners: – (No joint venture; Moury Construct via G. Moury SA is the main contractor. Funding: Private (likely commissioned by a real estate developer/investor). Moury’s role: General contractor for the entire build. Type: New construction. Sector: Residential (apartments).
Résidences-Services Building, La Calamine (Kelmis, Belgium) – Construction of a serviced senior-living residence in La Calamine. Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Contract awarded in late 2024; site works starting 2025. Expected completion: 2026 (anticipated). Partners: – (No JV; executed by Moury’s subsidiary G. Moury SA). Funding: Public-Private (project operated by non-profit or local authority; funding likely via regional senior housing programs). Moury’s role: General contractor, delivering a turnkey facility. Type: New construction. Sector: Residential (assisted living).
Social Housing Renovations, Boussu (Hainaut, Belgium) – Energy-efficiency renovation of 65 public housing units in the Haute Borne district of Boussu. Contract value: Not disclosed (part of a multi-site public housing program). Status: Ongoing (2024–2025). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: – (Managed by Moury’s subsidiary BEMAT SA). Funding: Public (Wallonia housing corporation). Moury’s role: General contractor (through BEMAT) for building envelope upgrades (insulation, HVAC, etc.). Type: Renovation (energy retrofit). Sector: Residential (social housing).
New Housing Construction, Gosselies (Charleroi, Belgium) – Development of 36 new residential units in Gosselies. Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Under construction (2024–2025). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: – (Handled by BEMAT SA for Moury group). Funding: Public (Charleroi social housing agency). Moury’s role: General contractor for ground-up construction. Type: New construction. Sector: Residential (social housing).
Multi-Site Housing Improvements, Charleroi (Belgium) – Safety and habitability upgrades across multiple housing sites for La Sambrienne (Charleroi’s public housing authority). Contract value: Not disclosed (framework contract). Status: Ongoing works (as of 2024). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: – (Executed by BEMAT SA). Funding: Public (municipal/regional housing funds). Moury’s role: General contractor for renovations (sanitation, structural repairs, fire safety) in occupied residences. Type: Renovation. Sector: Residential (social housing).
Montignies-sur-Sambre Housing Renovation (Hainaut, Belgium) – Energy retrofit and code compliance for 96 housing units in Montignies-sur-Sambre. Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Ongoing (2024–2025). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: Joint effort Moury (G. Moury SA) + BEMAT. Funding: Public (regional housing renovation program). Moury’s role: Joint general contractor (with its subsidiary) handling construction works. Type: Renovation (occupied buildings). Sector: Residential (social housing).
Non-Residential Building Projects
Administrative Center “Pôle Administratif”, Limbourg (Belgium) – Construction of a new civic administration complex to consolidate city services (municipal offices, CPAS welfare, police, library, etc.) in Dolhain-Limbourg. Contract value: Approx. €11.565 million total Status: Groundbreaking in Jan 2025 Expected completion: March 2026 (target for opening) Partners: – (No external JV; built by Moury Construct’s G. Moury SA) Funding: Public-Private Partnership – financed via a lease-type arrangement (the city pays ~€1,000/month over 30 years, with majority of cost covered by regional funds) Moury’s role: Design-build contractor (turnkey delivery). Type: New construction. Sector: Non-residential (government/admin).
“Cité des Métiers” and Digital Training Center, Namur (Belgium) – Design and construction of a 3,200 m² employment & skills center (housing the Namur Cité des Métiers, Forem Digital Factory, and STEAM training labs) on the Ilôt Rogier site (revitalized “Casernes” district). Contract value: Not disclosed (co-funded by Walloon recovery plan). Status: In progress (contract won Aug 2024, construction underway 2025). Expected completion: 2026 (opening to public) Partners: Moury Construct + Galère (BESIX) in joint execution. Funding: Public (EU/Regional) – conforming to “do no significant harm” sustainability criteria and financed by Wallonia’s plan. Moury’s role: Joint general contractor (Moury is co-leading the build alongside Galère). Type: New construction (with some adaptive reuse of existing structure on site). Sector: Non-residential (education/training facility).
Forem E-Logistics Training Center, Jumet (Charleroi, Belgium) – Construction of a new skills center for e-commerce and logistics training in Jumet. Contract value: Part of a €94 million regional investment in training centers (exact project budget not itemized). Status: Contract awarded late 2024; site works begin 2025. Expected completion: 2026 (estimated). Partners: Moury Construct + BEMAT (joint execution) Funding: Public (Wallonia/Forem development budget). Moury’s role: Joint contractor (lead builder for the facility) Type: New construction. Sector: Non-residential (vocational/industrial training).
Athénée Royal d’Angleur, Liège (Belgium) – Renovation of a large secondary school campus (Athénée of Angleur) including building upgrades and extension. Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Ongoing (work started 2024). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: – (No JV; executed by Moury’s G. Moury SA). Funding: Public (Federation Wallonie-Bruxelles education infrastructure fund). Moury’s role: General contractor for all renovation works. Type: Renovation & small extension. Sector: Non-residential (education – school).
Boarding School (“Internat”) Extension, Spa (Belgium) – Renovation and expansion of a boarding school facility in Spa. Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Ongoing (as of 2024). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: – (No JV; handled by G. Moury SA) Funding: Public (FW-B education budget). Moury’s role: General contractor. Type: Renovation & new extension. Sector: Non-residential (education – student dormitories).
Montefiore Institute Redevelopment, Liège (Belgium) – A heritage restoration and mixed-use redevelopment of the former Montefiore Institute (a 19th-century listed university building) in Liège’s Saint-Gilles district. The project entails restoring the historic façade and constructing modern extensions (including a glass tower for student residences) and offices/auditoria behind it. Contract value: Not public (the derelict site was acquired for ~€2 million in 2019; total redevelopment costs are substantially higher). Status: Underway (groundwork and structural works started 2021; ongoing through 2025). Expected completion: ~2025–2026. Partners: Moury Construct + Denys formed a joint venture (“Noshaq-Foremost” SPV) to purchase and develop the site. Funding: Private (joint investment by Moury and Denys, possibly with heritage grants). Moury’s role: Joint design-build contractor (Moury and Denys share construction duties, with Denys coordinating heavy works and Moury providing general contracting support) Type: Combination of renovation & new construction (adaptive reuse of classified heritage buildings with new high-rise additions). Sector: Non-residential (mixed: offices, educational facilities, student housing).
Verviers Fire Station (“Caserne des Pompiers”), Verviers (Belgium) – Construction of a major new fire brigade headquarters for the Vesdre-Hoëgne & Plateau emergency zone, including two interconnected buildings (an operations station and a logistics/maintenance facility). Contract value: €18 million (total cost) Status: Earthworks started late 2024; structural construction active in 2025. Expected completion: June 2027 (operational date) Partners: Moury Construct + Entreprises Guy Bernard (joint venture “société simple” for this project). Funding: Public (municipal and inter-municipal funds – cost shared by local communes; financing challenges acknowledged). Moury’s role: Joint general contractor (co-leading construction on site) Type: New construction. Sector: Non-residential (public safety infrastructure).
Infrastructure/Industrial Projects
Satellite Communications Anchor Station Building, Camp Roi Albert (Marche-en-Famenne, Belgium) – Construction of a new technical building to house a satellite communications ground station for the Belgian Defence forces. Contract value: Not disclosed (military contract). Status: Awarded 2023 via open tender; construction in 2024–2025. Expected completion: 2025. Partners: Moury Construct + Wust (BESIX) in joint venture. Funding: Public (Belgian Ministry of Defence) Moury’s role: Joint contractor, focusing on building construction (Wust/BESIX likely leading site coordination) Type: New construction. Sector: Infrastructure (military/telecom).
Renowatt Public-Building Energy Upgrades (Charleroi, Belgium) – Energy-efficiency retrofit program for various public buildings in Charleroi under the RENOWATT initiative. Contract value: Part of a larger multi-lot program (value not itemized). Status: Ongoing (Moury involved in Charleroi lots as of 2024). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: BEMAT + Duchêne (consortium for Charleroi RENOWATT lots) Funding: Public (Luminus/ESCO and regional funds under RENOWATT) Moury’s role: Joint contractor (through BEMAT) handling execution of energy-saving measures. Type: Renovation (retrofit of HVAC, insulation, etc.). Sector: Infrastructure (public buildings energy infrastructure).
A6K/E6K Innovation Hubs, Charleroi (Belgium) – Construction and refurbishment for high-tech training hubs in Charleroi’s Aeropole: includes a new-build E6K Innovation & Training Center and the rehabilitation of the “Tri Postal” building (A6K) as an electronics/IT hub. Contract value: Not disclosed (part of Aeropole redevelopment). Status: Ongoing (projects launched 2023–24). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: BEMAT + Duchêne (joint venture) Funding: Public (EU and Walloon Region innovation funds). Moury’s role: Joint contractor (BEMAT sharing construction with Duchêne). Type: New construction (E6K) and renovation (A6K) Sector: Infrastructure / industrial (innovation campus).
Rasart Senior Center Retrofit (Charleroi, Belgium) – Renovation and code-compliance upgrade of a municipal nursing home (“Centre 3ème Âge”) in Ransart (Charleroi) Contract value: Not disclosed. Status: Ongoing (2024–25). Expected completion: 2025. Partners: BEMAT + Moury + Mignone (three-party collaboration). Funding: Public (city of Charleroi and region). Moury’s role: Joint contractor (Moury and affiliates executing works). Type: Renovation. Sector: Non-residential (healthcare facility).
Disclaimer
This newsletter (the “Publication”) is provided solely for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security or other financial instrument, nor should it be interpreted as legal, tax, accounting, or investment advice. Readers should perform their own independent research and consult with qualified professionals before making any financial decisions. The information herein is derived from sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed to be accurate, complete, or current, and it may be subject to change without notice. Any forward-looking statements or projections are inherently uncertain and may differ materially from actual results due to various risks and uncertainties. Investing involves significant risk, including the potential loss of principal, and past performance is not indicative of future results. The author(s) may or may not hold positions in the securities discussed. Neither the author(s) nor the publisher, affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents shall be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, or punitive damages arising from the use of, or reliance on, this Publication.
“Bankruptcies on the Rise: In 2024 and 2025, Belgium has seen a marked increase in construction company bankruptcies, with a 21% rise compared to the previous year. In September 2024 alone, 306 Belgian construction companies went bankrupt. Many of these firms were either breaking even or operating at a loss before failing, highlighting widespread financial distress”
Allianz Trade. (2024, October 25). Construction bankruptcies peak in 2025. Allianz Trade in BeLux. https://www.allianz-trade.com/en_BE/news-insights/news/construction-report-october-2024.html
CEO Gilles-Olivier Moury, even states that they have the "luxury of choosing their clients" and that a 60% public tender to 40% private project ratio ensures security and stability.
Allianz Trade. (2024, October 25). Construction bankruptcies peak in 2025. https://www.allianz-trade.com/en_BE/news/latest-news/construction-bankruptcies-peak-in-2025.html
While Belgium interest rates have retreated from 2023 peaks, they remain high relative to the post-pandemic era, exacerbating affordability challenges. These factors are likely to constrain private construction activity through 2025. On the other hand, the recent ECB’s rate-cutting cycle that began in June 2024 with successive 25 basis point cuts and public infrastructure projects, supported by EU recovery funds, may offset some declines, but the residential and commercial segments may face a more prolonged stagnation.
Dorsey, P. (2008). The little book that builds wealth: The knockout formula for finding great investments. Wiley
I also like to have a margin of safety on risks mitigants, but that’s for another section.
Back in May 2023, I took note when Moury Construct SA acquired 100% of Ourth’Invest, the holding company behind D-FI SA—a well-regarded Belgian HVAC specialist. The deal was valued at €9 million and structured as a share acquisition of this family-owned business. Moury chose to keep D-FI’s leadership and 90 employees fully in place, allowing the company to continue operating independently. D-FI’s 2022 results included €15.2 million in revenue and €2.1 million in EBITDA.
Refer to footnote 1.
The green renovation wave is arguably the biggest structural shift happening in European construction. Thousands of homes and commercial buildings in Belgium need retrofitting (better insulation, upgraded heating, solar integration) and governments are subsidizing it heavily. This is creating an entirely new pool of work that sits alongside traditional construction.
Granted, one could debate what the appropriate level of cash is for a construction company to hold on its balance sheet—whether to reassure clients or to win tenders.
I like this write-up, thank you for releasing it for free.
I'm curious if you're at all concerned with the company potentially mean-reverting back to it's previous Gross and Operating margins pre-2021? Could the company be over earning because of a super cycle in renovations (Green subsidies, etc.)?
That's the big question mark off the top of my head.
Thanks for the long write-up, based on the numbers i agree, but you are not accounting that they got massive government spending help not only from the eu, but also from the walloon government after covid, and that's about to be over. There's also a lot of ifs in your write-up, so that's probably why they trade at what they trade. The liquidity is also extremely low, so just publishing on your blog about it increased the price of the share already.. What happens if the cash leaves the business as a dividend? Then you will pay a hefty tax, you portray it as if you know they will make all the right decisions. In my experience that seldom happens with small businesses. If I understand it correctly they built up that cash over years, so the roic numbers are off when they're not using it?